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Tariff reform  aimed at reducing  domestic  attempt  is to capture the reasoning  behind
protection  and the bias against  exports  holds the  "typical"  Bank recommendations.
threat of widening  the fiscal  deficit  by causing
tariff revenue  to decline.  Because  the success  of  Rajaram  finds that the quality  of analysis
an adjustment  program  depends  critically  on the  underlying  Bank recommendations  in this regard
correction  of fiscal  imbalances  to achieve  is highly uneven.  The following  broad conclu-
stabilization,  tariff reforms  must be coordinated  sions  are indicated:
with tax policy recommendations  to develop
altemative  revenue  sources.  Conversely,  the  *  Revenue  concems  are often  not adequately
tariff reformis  must eliminate  the protective  addr2ssed  in the design of tariff proposals.  In a
elements  of domestic  tax structures  if they are to  few cases this neglect  may have contributed  to
truly  achieve  their protection  objectives.  policy reversal.
Rajaram  reviews  the extent to which  the  - The protective  effect of domestic indirect
Bank's analysis  and tariff recommendations  in  taxes is often  not recognized  and thus not
twelve countries  (Bangladesh,  Ghana,  Indonesia,  incorporated  into  the reform  of the structure  of
Jamaica,  Malawi,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  the Philip-  protection.
pines, Thailand,  Turkey,  Zaire, and Zambia)
reflected  such an integrated  framework.  He  * Although  there is little consensus  on a
focuses  on (1) the revenue  impact  of tariff  desirable  tariff structure,  in a few cases the Bank
reform,  (2) the effect of domestic  indirect  taxes  has recommended  a uniform  nominal  tariff.  This
on protection,  and (3) the structure  of protection.  could be seen as the logical culmination  of
The review  is admittedly  selective  and the  attempts  to narrow  the range of tariffs.
The  Policy  Research  Working  PaperSeriesdissemiinates  therndingsof  workunderway  in theBank.  Anobjectiverof  de senes
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations  are less than fully polished. 'Me fndings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions in these papers  do not necesarily repnesent  official Bank policy.
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1.  The liberalization  of trade has been a significant  plank in the Bank's attempt  to reform
the policy environment  in developing  countries. The reduction  of tariffs in this context is prompted
mainly by the desire to lower the level and structure of protection to domestic industries  and to
reduce the corresponding  bias against exports.  However, trade taxes constitute a major source of
revenue for many countries and recommendations  to reduce protection necessarily have revenue
implications.  Since  the success  of an adjustment  program is often seen to depend in a critical way on
the correction  of fiscal imbalances,  it is imperative  that the revenue consequences  of tariff reform be
anticipated.  Thus, where tariff reductions  are expected  to lead to revenue  losses, trade policy advice
must be integrated  with tax policy recommendations  to develop alternative  revenue sources.
2.  Conversely,  attempts  to reform the structure  of protection  cannot ignore  the role of the
domestic indirect tax structure since the latter can and, in many of these countries, does affect
protection. A domestic sales tax that applies  at a higher rate on imports than on domestic  goods has
a protective effect similar to a customs duty and must be incorporated  into the design of tariffs.
Protection can also emerge from more subtle  aspects  of the application  of domestic taxes to imports
and local products.
3.  This paper conducts  a selective review of the extent to which trade policy and tax
policy concerns  are integrated  in recommendations  by the Bank. The review  covers twelve countries:
Bangladesh,  Ghana, Indonesia,  Jamaica,  Malawi,  Morocco, Pakistan,  Philippines,  Thailand,  Turkey,
Zambia and Zaire.  In addition to gauging the extent to which tariff proposals adopted a 'public
finance' perspective as noted in (2) and (3) above, the paper attempts  to describe the typical Bank
recommendations  as they relate to tariff structure and the tariff treatment of intermediate  inputs.'
4.  The evidence  on the revenue impact of the Bank's trade proposals suggests  that there
is scope for improvement  in developing alternative  revenue sources. The Bank has often proposed
to replace  QRs with tariffs and to reduce tariffs. The response  to short-term  revenue concerns  in the
light of these proposals was that revenue would not decline by much, if at all. The reason for this
assessment  was that while tariff reductions  would lead to some revenue loss, it would be offset by
additions  to the tariff base caused by a) QR items being transferred to the tariff list, b) removal of
existing  exemptions,  and c) increased  imports  through legal channels.  In a few cases, as in Zaire, the
revenue loss due to reduction of the maximum  tariff was expected  to be more than offset by an
increase in the minimum tariff. Sometimes this optimistic reasoning was buttressed by  model
simulations that indicated the revenue effect of alternative scenarios. On occasion the Bank has
recommended  alternative  tax measures  in an effort to offset revenue decline  due to tariff reductions.
However, in a few cases this proved to be inadequate  and the resultant  revenue shortfall exacerbated
the fiscal imbalance  and contributed  to policy reversal.
5.  The Bank has addressed  the longer-term  need to reduce the reliance on trade taxes for
revenue on only a few occasions. In one case it recommended  shifting the revenue function  to the
domestic indirect tax by broadening the base and elasticity of this tax while reducing tariffs on
imports.  In another,  it recommended  moving  towards  the development  of a manufacturing-cum-import
As some time has elapsed since this study was conducted, the paper does not pretend to be current with reforms and
developments that have occurred after  1989 for the countries in the sample.  It nevertheless offers a useful review of Bank
recommendations in this area.- ii -
stage VAT which would shoulder the burden of the revenue function  by taxing consumption  rather
than imports and inputs.
6.  In a large number of cases, the Bank did make reference  to the need to "harmonize"
the domestic  tax treatment  of imports  and domestic  production.  The asymmetric  treatment  of domestic
and imported  goods  under the domestic  indirect  tax system  implies  that the domestic indirect  tax may
add to or offset the protective  effect of customs  duties. In most cases this issue was not addressed
adequately  since the protective effect of domestic taxes can occur for reasons other than the obvious
one of differences in statutory tax rates. In the case of Zambia  the Bank recommended  "unification
of the sales tax on imports  and domestic products at 15%" without noting that the sales tax would
apply to imported inputs and not to domestic input producers. The sales tax on imports  thus added
15% protection  to import competing  firms over and above  that provided  by the customs  duty of 10%
on imported inputs. Given this lack of analytical  thoroughness  even in cases where the issue was
signalled, the presumption  in cases where the issue was  not discus.  d should be that the problem  was
not identified  rather than that it did not exist.
7.  The review suggests that there is superficial  consistency  in the broad thrust of the
recommendations  on tariff structure. In almost  all cases the Bank proposed  replacing  QRs with tariffs
and suggested that the level and the range of nominal tariffs be reduced. Aside from this broad
similarity, however, the reports reviewed were very uneven in their analysis  and recommendations.
In most cases the Bank did not spell out a long term objective of reform beyond the standard
prescription  of reducing the level and range of ERPs while  in a few it went so far as to indicate  that
the ultimate objective  of twriff  policy should be a uniform nominal  tariff.
8.  There is considerable  variation  in the recommended  tariff treatment  of raw material  and
intermediate  inputs reflecting  opposite  concerns  regarding the structure of protection. In some cases
the concern is with relatively high levels of tariff on imported inputs which is seen to retard th
development  of downstream  industries  while in others low tariffs on inputs is thought to prevent the
development  of upstream industries  and/or provide excessive  protection to downstream  indust.ies.
In many instances  the suggested  treatment is to increase the tariff on inputs to narrow the ERP on
final goods while ensuring that there is some tariff escalation, i.e. final goods are taxed at a higher
rate than inputs. In some cases increasing  the tariff on inputs while  lowering  the maximum  tariff (on
final goods) is a method to approach  a uniform  nominal tariff objective.TARIFF  AND TAX REFORMS
I. Introduction
Issues of  trade  liberalization are an  important component of the  Bank's policy
recommendations  to member countries.  A major focus of trade liberalization  is the dismantling  of an
existing  pervasive  system  of trade controls  -quantitative  restrictions,  import  tariffs, export  taxes, etc.-
which distort the allocation  of resources  between  tradeable and non-tradeable  sectors and, within the
tradeable sector, discriminate  against exports.
T'he  sequence  of trade liberalization  measures  has  been widely  discussed  and is reflected
in most Bank recommendations.  The typical  strategy  for achieving  trade reforms is to begin with the
replacement  of QRs by tariffs, and in further stages to progress to reforms that restructure tariffs.
The 1987  World Development  Report notes that reducing  the average level and the dispersion  of the
rates of protection  are two objectives  of tariff reform. Tariff reduction  methods  include: a) an equal
proportional  cut in all tariffs, b) equiproportional  reduction  of each  tariff over a target level, c) higher
propo!nicnal  reduction of higher tariffs, d) lowering  the highest rates to the next highest level, and
so on, in what is described  as the concertina method.
While considerable  attention  has been  paid  to the rationale  and strategy  for trade reform
there is relatively little discussion  of the integration  of the recommendations  for tariff reform with
other dimensions  of economic  policy.  This paper attempts  to assess the extent to which the Bank
integrates  trade and tax policy concerns  in its recommendations  for trade liberalization.  It is important
to bring a 'public finance' perspective  to bear on this issue for at least two reasons.
i. Trade taxes constitute  a major source of revenue for many countries  and recommendations
to reduce protection  have revenue implications.  From the point of view of both short term and-2-
long  term  revenue concerns, trade policy advice must  be  integrated with  tax  policy
re& x  iendations  designed  to develop alternative  revenue  sources.
ii. Conversely, attempts to reform the structure of protection cannot ignore the role of the
domestic indirect  tax structure  since the I itter can, and in nmany  of these eountries  does, aff_c
protection.
It  is now recognized  that one of the most important constraints  to trade reform is
conflict between trade policy recommendations  and stabilization  goals.'  Since revenue shortfalls
can seriously undermine macroeconomic  programs as well as cause reversal of trade reform, it is
important  that recommendations  to reduce  tariffs be accompanied  by well conceived  policies  designed
to generate revenue in a less distortionary  manner.
The purpose of this paper is largely factual and that is to assess the nature of Bank
recommendations  dealing with tariff reform and the extent to which it does or does not adopt such
a public finance  perspective. This perspective  is discussed  at length in Mitra (1992)  but its essential
insight can be indicated  as follows: all developing  countries  have essentially  two sets of instruments
for the taxation  of imports:  (a) customs duties, and (b) sales taxes/value-added  taxes.  Discussion
of the interaction between these two instruments is often missing in Bank analysis.  In fact. few
studies  even provide  the breakdown  of sales tax revenue  from imports  and from domestic  goods. The
proportion of import taxes due to customs duties and the proportion  due to domestic indirect taxes
are often not reported even though this would  be critical in the design of tariff and tax reforms.
Recognizing  that imports can be taxed by these two instruments  suggests that some
matching  of function  and instrument  may be desirable  and it is here that the public  finance  perspective
is useful. In principle, the customs duty alone should have the protection  role while both customs
World Bank (1989), p.3 3.-3-
duties and the sales tax/VAT  should function  as revenue instruments. 2 Currently, many developing
countries  rely excessively  on customs duties for revenue wh  '- also allowing elements  of protection
to be built into their domestic indirect tax.  Coordinating  the reform of this system of tariffs and
domestic indirect  taxes will require:
1.  Ensuring that  the sales tax/VAT is  applied symmetrically to  imports and  domestic
production  so as to transfer  the protection  function  to the customs  duty. Both  tax rate symmetry
and appropriate  definition  of the tax base will be required to achieve  this objective. Items not
produced  domestically  should be subject to the domestic sales tax and not the customs duty.
2. Reducing  protection  per se requires matching  the reduction in customs  duty by an increase
in sales tax/VAT rates. Since the sales tax applies to imported a  domestic  goods, revenue
neutral reform can be attained  by raising  sales tax rates by a smaller amount  than the decrease
in customs duty.
This perspective  also suggests  useful rules of thumb for an integrated  structure of taxes
and tariffs that provide acceptable  outcomes  regarding  efficiency,  equity and protection. In addition,
it provides a discussion  of the desirable tariff treatment of intermediates  and final goods. While the
interested reader is referred to Mitra's paper for the detailed arguments  we can ;-  icate what such
rules of thumb may be.
Taiff  Structure:
i. A uniform customs duty rate of no more than 10 to 15 percent.
ii. Imported inputs entering export production  should be exempted  from the customs duty.
Domestic  Indirect Tax:
iii. A value-added tax, preferably of the consumption type, applied at a uniform rate to
domestic production and imports but exempting  agriculture, especially non-marketed  food
consumed  by the poor. The VAT should feature a uniform rate whose level is determined  by
revenue requirements  while applying  a zero rate to exports.
2  The following qualification is in order here: if the administrative costs of a sales tux/VAT are very high, it is
conceivable  that the customs duty is the optimal revenue instrument.4 -
iv. Selected  luxury items, both domestic production and import, should be taxed by excise
taxes.
Export taxes:
v. Wheie a country's exports are subject  to a quota  or where world demand is inelastic,  export
taxes are appropriate.
These rules of thumb emerge from viewing  taxes and tariffs in an integrated  fashion. High uniform
tariffs (say 30%) are inadvisable  because they are likely to create problems in the administration  of
the duty exemption  scheme for imported inputs used in export production.
II. Issues
This paper reviews specific  trade and tax reform proposals and, where accessible,  the
underlying analysis. The countries chosen for this review include: Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines,  Thailand, Turkey, Zambia and Zaire. Since the
Bank has been active in making reconurmendations  on trade and tax policy in these countries, this
sample allows  us to study the extent to which revenue  and protection  considerations  have influenced
policy recommendations. 3 The review, which is illustrative  rather than comprehensive  in its scope,
focussed on the following  questions:
A) Tariffs and Revenue: Were the revenue effects  of tariff reform proposals anticipated  and
were complementary  tax measures  recommended  to preserve revenue?
B) Protection and Domestic Taxes: Did the analysis recognize the protective effect of
domestic indirect  taxes? What measures  were proposed to counter this effect?
C) Structure of Tariffs: What structure ef tariffs was typically proposed? What was the
recommended tariff treatment of intermediate  good imports vis a vis final goods? Were
uniform tariffs recommended?
3  Recommendations  contained in recent Bank operations are not included in this review.  For example, SALAIl  for Morocco
contains recommendations  on trade reforms that are still under negotiation  and thus not included in this review.-5  -
A. TARIFFS  AND REVEiNUE
The record on whether adequate  attention is paid to analysing  the revenue impact of tariff
proposals and if alternate sources of tax revenue are identified  where indicated  is very disparate. It
indicates that Bank recommendations  could be  improved considerably.  The discussion below
classifies the country cases according to  the extent to  which the tariff recommendations  were
complimented  by a concern for safeguarding  revenue. In some cases trade reforms were viewed, in
and of themselves, as revenue neutral (Indonesia, Zaire,  Philippines).  In  a number of cases,
proposals  to safeguard  revenue  were neglected  as concerns  about  reforming  the structure  of protection
dominated  the recommendations (hailand,  Pakistan, Turkey and Jamaica). In other cases adjust-
ments to the domestic indirect  tax regime were seen as necessary  to offset expected  revenue losses
due to tariff reform. The domestic  indirect  tax recommendations  ranged  from ad hoc rate adjustments
(Morocco)  to more fundamental  tax reform (Malawi, Bangladesh).
INDONESIA: While tariff reform and  reduction has been a  consistent theme of  the Bank's
recommendations  to Indonesia, there is very little explicit  discussion  of the revenue effect of these
measures. Two reasons  may be cited for this observation;  since Indonesia  in the early eighties relied
heavily on licensing restrictions to control imports, import tariffs initially provided only about 5
percent of government revenue.  The shift from QRs to tariffs could thus have been expected to
improve, rather than reduce, revenue generation from customs duties, eliminating the need for
revenue safeguarding measures.  Moreover, while discussion of a comprehensive  tax reform in
Indonesia  had evidently  considered  the need for effi,  v:  it revenue-raising,  the effect of trade reforms
on revenue was not highlighted  since these were viewed  as minor revenue sources. However, these
points were not explicitly  indicated  in the context  of the tariff recommendations,  suggesting  that the
framework  did not integrate  protection  and revenue objectives  to the extent desirable.-6-
ZAIRE: In Zaire, recommendations  to narrow the range of tariffs by introducing  a minimum  tariff
of 10 percent and a maximum  tariff of 60 percent were expected  to increase revenue by US$11
million. The positive revenue  effect  of the increased  minimum  duty was expected  to more than offset
any decline from the lowering  of  ,h end tariffs.  The measures were not effectively  implemented
so that it is not possible to assess the validity  of these priurs.
PHILIPPINES:  The ex-ante  revenue analysis  of the tariff reform under SAL I estimated  the revenue
loss due to tariff reductions to be negligible  and gave the following  reasons for this conclusion: a)
there would be little revenue loss from the reduction of the high tariff rates because the quantities
imported at those rates were small, b) there may be a revenue  gain from the increase in tariff rates
on high volume items, and c) import liberalization  would enable revenue to be earned on items
formerly restrained by licensing requirements. Some positive revenue measures  were nevertheless
recommended: QRs on non-essential  consumer imports were to be replaced by higher domestic
commodity  taxes to discourage consumption  and were expect-d to raise P1 billion.  New indirect
taxes were planned and expected  to raise P300 million in additional  revenue.
Following these recommendations  the average tariff rate was reduced from 43% in 1980  to
30% in 1982. Import values  and tariff re-enue in 1982  remained  at the 1980  dollar levels suggesting
that the tariff reform per s  was indeed revenue neutral. 4 However, the economy  deteriorated in
1983-86  and the crisis caused  the government  to impose  an across the board 3 percent import tax and
a domestic transaction  tax based on tur iover.  Import liberalization  was stalled by the crisis but the
tariff reforms were accomplished  by 1985.
4  1 am grateful to Erika  Jorgensen for comments  on an earlier draft  that helped clarify this point.-7  -
P  AKISTAN:  The Pink funded  an ERP study by the Pakistan  Institute  of Development  Studies whose
tariff recommendations  were not accepted  by the government  largely because, in their view, it paid
inadequate  attention  to the revenue  and employment  effects  of the proposals. Subsequent  analysis  by
the Bank considered  the revenue and employment  implications. It also recommended  development
of a broad-based  sales tax to release the revenue constraint and enable further tariff reforms to
proceed.
THflILAND: Revenue  decline  caused a reversal of previous tariff reductions  in Thailand. A Bank
review of SAL lending concluded that the Bank recommendations  for revenue enhancement  had
focussed on one-time  increases rather than elasticity-increasing  tax reforms.  It also suggested that
short term revenue effects  of tariff reduction  may have  been underestimated  and contributed  to policy
reversal.  An IMF study recommended  tariff reductions to  a level where they served a purely
protective function.  The revenue effects of these measures were expected to be compensated  by
reforms in domestic indirect  taxation  and the long term development  of a consumption-type  VAT.
-TURKEY:  In Turkey, the prutection-reducing  effect of tariff reforms over the period 1980-85  were
partially offset by the introduction  of a dollar denominated  levy in  1985.  While the Bank was
separately  recommending  domestic  tax reforms such Es the introduction  of the VAT, these were slow
in being implemented. It is clear that the tariff reforms did not ease the fiscal  pressure and may have
contributed  to the growth of surtaxes  on trade earmarked  to Extra Budgetary  Funds.  A subsequent
study took more explicit  note of the need to coordinate  tariff reductions  and tax reforms. The report
observed that
"trade taxes are an  inefficient revenue collection device because they introduce
production distortions in addition to consumer price distortion. They are however-8  -
easy to collect. But now that Turkey has a well functioning VAT, which avoids
production  distortions,  the latter argument  holds with less force."
JAMAICA: In the latter half of the eighties, the responsibility  for domestic tax reform in Jamaica
rested with the USAID  while  the Bank and the Fund made  trade regime recommendations. However,
Bank analysis contains little discussion of  the revenue effect of  tariff  reform and  necessary
adjustments  in domestic  tax rates. The only reference  to any revenue impact  was  the observation  that
exempting  input  imports  from customs  duty reduced  revenues  and created  pressure  to increase income
taxes  to compensate. A subsequent  discussion  observed  that implementing  the scheduled  VAT would
allow further progress in tariff reforms but failed to indicate  in what way the two were perceived to
be related.
MOROCCO:  The Bank recommended  eliminating  th'- Special Import Tax (S1)  and expected  the
revenue loss feared by the government  to be offset by a 2 percent increase in the sales tax rate and
the revenue from export  income  taxes. The anticipated  increase  in income  taxes was a miscalculation
and failed to  materialize since both export income and agricultural income had previously been
exempted  from taxation. A subsequent  tariff increase  was due to the revenue shortfall  on this account
and the poor initial performance  of the VAT.
MALAWI: Under SAL I and 11,  the Bank recommended  shifting  from taxing external transactions
to taxing domestic transactions with the objective of broadening  the tax base and lowering rates.
'These  steps were designed  to correct the problem of poor revenue performance. The government
initially  took a number  of measures  (increased  tariffs across the board, and imposed  duties and levies)
not consistent  with these objectives.-9  -
In 1985  the Bank suggested  sweeping  reforms in the tariff and tax structure involving
a sharp reduction in the tariff rates and recommended  increases in the domestic indirect tax rate to
offset revenue loss. The Bank recommended  i) eliminating  import duties  on non-competing  imports
(which constituted  80 percent of imports), and  ii) reducing tariff rates on competing  imports and
intermediate  goods. It was suggested  that the rate of surtax (domestic  indirect  tax) be raised from 30
to 35 percent to offset the revenue loss from the tariff reduction. While the short term objective  was
revenue neutrality, the proposals were expected  to increase tax elasticity in the longer run.  In fact,
as a result of delays in the implementation  of tariff reductions,  the short term effect on revenue was
positive.
BANGLADESH:  In 1987 a Bank study anticipated  the impact  of tariff reductions  to be of the order
of 2-3 percent of total tax revenue in the event the volume  of imports remained  the same. The study
recommended  that tax reforms should accompany  the tariff reforms with the specific objective of
generating  revenue to offset the revenue lost from tariff reductions. rhe  replacement  of QRs by
tariffs was recognized as a partial revenue offset.  A subsequent  study recommended  wide ranging
reforms designed  to increase tax elasticity and improve  revenue generation. Increased compliance
under a regime with lowered tariffs was expected to  increase revenue.  A value added tax was
introduced  in July 1991 with positive revenue impact.- 10-
B. PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC TAXES
In most discussions  of protection  policy it is tacitly assumed  that protection  is provided
by customs  duties  and/or QRs. This view overlooks  the fact  that domestic  indirect  taxes in developing
countries  frequently  have an effect on protection  because  the tax rate on domestic  goods and imports
may not be identical. Even in cases  where the statutory  tax rates are equal, separate 'markup' factors
may be used or the definition  of the value base may be inappropriate  so that protection  to domestic
production  is affected. Exemption  from sales taxes for selected  domestic  industries  serves to add to
the protection received by such industries.  On the other hand, excise taxes often apply only to
domestic  goods and have the effect of reducing  the protection  given  by the tariff structure. Reforms
to the domestic indirect tax structure which address these aspects must therefore accompany  tariff
reforms designed  to restructure  protection. In the discussion  below we focus on whether  Bank  studies
seek to eliminate  the protective  effect of domestic taxes. It should  be emphasized  that tariffs continue
to play a protective role in all the cases.
A number  of studies included  a comment  on the need  to reform features  of the domestic
indirect  tax system that discriminated  between imports  and domestic items.  However, the analysis
underlying  the proposals was often inadequate. In a few cases, initial studies identified  elements  of
protection in the domestic tax system and recommended  reforms.  Subsequent  analysis discovered
additional  elements  of protection  that had been overlooked. While a large number of reports did not
discuss  the issue at all, we cannot conclude  that protection  deriving  from domestic indirect  taxes was
not relevant in these cases.- 11  -
PHILIPPINES: Under SAL II in 1983 the Bank recommended  the elimination of the protective
element in the Indirect tax system which derived from the differential treatment of imported and
domestic goods.  It was estimated that one third of the ERP for manufacturing  was due to the
protective  effect  of indirect  taxes. Legislation  was to be introduced  to dismantle  the advance  sales tax
in phases - in the first phase the differential markups for imports and domestic items were to be
replaced  by uniform  rates. In the second phase the advance  sales tax was  to be displaced  by a second
stage sales tax with tax credit provisions. This tax would include higher rates for luxury products
and constituted  a step towards the introduction  of a full fledged VAT. The excise tax was also to be
restructured. Accordingly,  in 1983  the specific  tax on imported  and local cigars, and high tax bracket
cigarettes were made uniform and the tax differential on local and imported alcoholic  drinks was
reduced. The recently introduced  VAT treats imports and domestic  goods symmetrically.
ZAIRE:  A higher rate of sales tax applied to imports than to domestic goods in Zaire and a study
recommended equalizing the  statutory tax  rates on domestic and  imported goods. However,
subsequent  studies have noted that because the sales tax on domestic goods is a cascading  tax, the
lower tax rate is justified.
BANGLADESH:  In 1987 the Bank noted that the use of a sales tax that applied only to imports
multiplied  the number of effective  tariff rates and recommended  that this tax be eliminated  by first
reducing  the number  of rates, introducing  a zero rate, and gradually  shifting  most imports  to the zero
rate.  The study did not comment on the fact that the sales tax should serve a revenue and not a
protective function.  A subsequent  analysis  recommended  the introduction  of a manufacturing  and
import stage VAT to replace the existing excise and sales taxes on imports.  This was expected  to- 12-
feature symmetric  treatment of domestic and imported goods.  A VAT with these features was
introduced in 1991.
GHANA: A number of different studies have recommended  the adjustments required to achieve
symmetrical  domestic  sales and excise tax treatment  of imports  and domestic  goods in Ghana. Earlier
reports  addressed rate  symmetry while later  reports have discussed more subtle sources of
discrimination. Until 1986, the sales tax rate on most domestic  products was 10 percent whereas
corresponding  imports  were subject  to a 20 percent sales tax rate.  A Bank mission estimated  that a
20 percent consolidated  sales tax on duty-exclusive  manufacturing  would alsG  match the 20 percent
sales tax on the duty exclusive  value of imports.
Excise taxes in Ghana  did not apply to imports  in 1986  and thus discriminated  against
domestic products.  The Bank recommended  consolidating  the excise on non-traditional  items into
the reformed sales tax which offered symmetric  treatment of imports and domestic goods.  Imports
of the remaining excisable  goods were also brought under the excise tax net at the same rates as
domestic products thus eliminating  the negative  protection in the excise tax.  Achievement  of this
sales and excise tax symmetry  was seen to shift the protective function  to the tariff.
One final wrinkle  in the excise  tax remained  to be corrected. A 1988  mission  noted  that
the excise  tax is applied to imports  on the excise tax exclusive  (cif) price while  domestic  producers,
owing to the history of price setting, are taxed on the excise tax inclusive  price.  Thus an element
of discrimination  against domestic  producers remains in the excise tax.  The report recommended
using a common  excise  tax-exclusive  basis for both import and domestic excise  taxes  to eliminate  this
discrimination.- 13 -
MOROCCO:  The Bank has recommended  harmonization  of the sales tax on domestic  and imported
goods in Morocco.  One Bank report supported  the IMF's recommendation  that Morocco introduce
a VAT and noted that some measures would facilitate this, such as lowering domestic taxes on
imported  products to the level of taxes on similar Moroccan  products.
In 1984  the Bank made indirect  tax proposals related  to the harmonization  of the sales
tax treatment of domestic and imported goods, and measures to reduce cascading  of the sales tax.
In particular, it recommended  abolishing  differences in sales tax rates for domestic and imported
goods.
MALAWI: In 1985 a report on Malawi  recommended  symmetric  domestic tax treatment of imports
and domestic items.  At the time, the surtax applied at different rates on imports and domestic
products; 30 percent of the duty inclusive  price for imports and 25 percent of producer price for
domestic goods.  The import levy of 5 percent of the cif price and the import duty itself increased
the differential tax treatment of domestic and imported  products.
The report recommended  that the complex system of import duties, levy, surtax and
excise should  be replaced  almost  entirely  by a single  tax, the surtax,  applied  at one flat basic tax rate
on all commodities,  domestic  and imported, levied ex factory or at the point of import.  The surtax
was essentially  a VAT since taxation  of inputs would be avoided by allowing  surtax paid on inputs
to be credited against tax due on output.  The elimination  of input taxation implied that domestic
industries  would  benefit from increased  protection. To avoid this, tari'fs on competing  imports  were
reduced.
The existing structure was replaced  with a two rate (0 and 35%) system that applied
to imported and locally  produced luxury goods symmetrically.  Raising  the surtax rates allowed  the
lowering  of high tariffs and the elimination  of import  levies without  loss of revenue. The integrated- 14 -
determination  of the surtax (VAT) and trade taxes in this case allowed an improvement in the
incentive  structure of the trade regime while creating  a relatively non-distorting  consumption  tax for
revenue generation.  It should be noted however, that the excise tax applies only to  domestic
production  and thus continues  to have a negative-protection  role.
THAILAND: The Bank's SALs did not raise issue with the differential application of domestic
indirect taxes  to imports  and domestic  products. By contrast, the IMF highlighted  this issue in 1987,
noting that the Business  Tax assumed  a protective function  by taxing imports at a higher rate than
domestic goods through the arbitrary and high assessment  of profit margins on imported goods to
determine  the taxable price.  Reforms were suggested  to the business  tax which would reduce this
and other  distortions  and take the system  towards the eventual  objective  of a consumption  type VAT.
The excise  tax also required correction  of differential  treatment  of imports  and domestic
products.  Since excise duties on imports were levied on a base consisting  of c.i.f. Ulus  customs
duties Ulu mark-ups of arbitrary "standard"  profit rates, they functioned  as arbitrary instruments  of
protection.  Imported  beer  and  distilled  spirits  were  taxed  at a lower  effective  rate  than  local  products
(thus  functioning  as a "negative  protection"  instrument)  while  other imports  were taxed at higher rates
than domestic  counterparts. The comparison  of the effective  excise tax on different items was also
complicated  by whether  it was  assessed  on the retail  or wholesale  price  and by the arbitrary  process
of price  assessment  - both  for imported  and  domestic  products.  The  IMF recommended  rationalizing
the excise  tax value  base and  dismantling  the protective  and anti-protective  function  of this tax by
imposing  symmetric  rates  on imports  and domestic  products.  The c.i.f. value  plu  customs  duty for
imports  and the ex-factory  manufacturer's  price were recommended  as appropriate  tax bases for
domestic  products.- 15  -
PAKISTAN:  The domestic  indirect  tax structure in Pakistan  did have a protection  component  which
was addressed  in various Bank studies. The domestic sales tax at one stage applied at different rates
to domestic and imported  goods and/or exempted  a large class of domestic goods while taxing their
imported counterparts. The excise tax had the opposite  effect, of reducing protection, by applying
only to domestic production  of some goods. While the sales tax rates have been equalized  the other
features of the indirect  tax system still need to be corrected.
JAMAICA:  A study financed  by the US-AID  recommended  a VAT (General  Consumption  Tax) for
Jamaica which would consolidate  the various internal levies into one broad based tax and treat
imports  and domestic goods  similarly. While the study did not mention  it, it was indicated  elsewhere
that some domestically  produced  goods were subject to the excise tax while corresponding  imports
were not.
INDONESIA:  A limited  VAT at the manufacturer's  level was introduced  by the Government  in 1985
as part of a comprehensive  tax reform and subsequently  expanded to the wholesale level.  The
potential protective effect of the VAT was avoided by the symmetric treatment of imports and
domestic goods under the VAT.
ZAMBIA:  Zambia illustrates  some of the complexity  of identifying  the protective  effect of domestic
indirect taxes.  Prior to changes  in 1985, the sales tax in Zambia applied to all imports (final and
intermediate  goods) but only to some domestic  final goods. Moreover, imports  were taxed at 12.5%
while domestic goods were subject to a  10% sales tax rate. This structure of the sales tax was
protective in three ways: (a) the rate differentiation  protected all domestic import competing  firms
that were subject  to the sales tax by an additional  2.5%, (b) domestic  final goods not subject  to the- 16 -
sales tax were protected by the full amount  of the 12.5% sales tax on imports, and (c) the sales tax
applied to imported inputs but not to domestic  input production,  thus providing  an additional 12.5%
of sales tax protection  to domestic input  producers. In 1985, the Bank included a recommendation
to unify the rates on imports and domestic  goods at 15% and to expand the base of the sales tax to
include all local final goods  produced in significant  amounts  as part of its loan conditionality. This
addressed points (a) and (b) above but neglected  (c) and, by increasing  the rate of the sales tax, in-
creased the protective  effect of the tax on input  production.  Tariff reforms that had recently  increased
the nominal tariffs on inputs to a minimum of 1C%, citing the existence of low or zero rates on
inputs, completely  neglected  to incorporate  the tariff-like  effect of the sales tax. The combined  effect
of the minimum tariff and the increase in the discriminatory  sales tax rate was to raise the nominal
protection  to domestic input producers by a further 12.5%.
C. STRUCTURE OF TARIMFS
In the following  section  we review the consistency  of Bank proposals with respect to
tariff structure and ask whether these proposals corresponded  in any way to the principles outlined
in the 'rules of thumb' suggested  by an integrated  perspective. 5 While all the country cases involved
recommendations  to dismantle  QRs and import licensing restrictions and reduce tariffs, the specific
recommendations  differed in the details.  The objective  of most tariff proposals was to reduce the
level and range of nominal tariffs and this was sought to be achieved  by lowering  maximum  tariffs
and establishing  a narrow band within which all tariffs would lie.  In some cases,  minimum  tariffs
were to be raised.  This strategy of compressing  the tariff range has its logical culmination  in a
uniform tariff and in a number  of cases this objective  was stated explicitly. In one case a uniform
See page  3 for the rules of thumb.- 17  -
ERY  was recommended  for a particular sector (TMailand).  In a few cases the Bank recommended  a
uniform nominal tariff  with additional time bound tariff  protection for  new/infant industries
(Morocco, Thailand).
Two opposite  concerns  are expressed  in some Bank studies, one of which sits uneasily
with the general thrust of recommendations  towards  a uniform  tariff.  These  have to do with the tariff
treatment of inputs and the implications  for protection  of upstream and downstream  industries.  In a
number of cases it was felt that tariff escalatin  (lower tariffs on  inputs relative to  outputs)
contributed  to excessive  protection  to downstream  industries  since ERPs were rendered greater than
the nominal  tariff. It was felt in the case  of Thailand  that the development  of upstream  industries  was
retarded if input  tariffs were low while in the case of Zaire the Bank study noted  that the high degree
of tariff escalation  created incentives  for uneconomic  assembly  type industries. Raising  the tariff on
inputs  while lowering  final good tariffs was the recommended  solution.
The opposite  concern  and implication  for tariff structure  was expressed  in Pakistan  and
Indonesia  where it was felt that high tariffs on inputs saddle downstream  industries  with high costs,
lower the ERP, and retards downstream  development. The implication  in this case is to lower input
tariffs although in other cases it may lead to suggestions  to raise final good tariffs. In the case of
Bangladesh  the anomaly of higher tariffs on inputs than final goods was sought to be eliminated  by
lowering  input tariffs.
PHILIPPINES:  In 1980 the Bank recommended  tariff reductions to lower the average ERP while
narrowing the band between high and low tariffs. The Bank recommended  tar.ff reform to reduce
average ERPs and to narrow the range of nominal tariffs to a band of 10-50  percent. It also urged
a  phased program of liberalization of QRs on non-essential consumer imports and unclassified
imports.- 18  -
In 1987 the Bank attempted  to initiate broad ranging reforms including the areas of
taxation and trade as part of the Economic  Recovery  Loan. A further review of the tariff structure
with the purpose of identifying  areas for reform and potential  for reducing  tariff rates further was to
be completed  and a new tariff schedule  was  to be announced  by end-1988,  while the remaining  items
subject to QRs were to be liberalized.
THAILAND: In Thailand, a maximum  and a minimum  tariff were set and the SAL recommended
eliminating  the tariff exemption  of capital intensive  firms for the import of machinery.  Later studies
noted that the effect of these tariff changes  was to greatly increase  the ERPs for light intermediate
manufactures  and lower the ERP for heavy intermediate  and investment  goods. A subsequent SAL
based its recommendations  on the need to achieve  uniform  ERP across the electrical  goods industry.
The IMF commented  that the existence  of tariff escalation, wherein the rates on raw
materials  and intermediate  inputs were lower than those on final goods, implied  that i) ERPs were
high and widely dispersed, and ii) created a bias against  the development  of an indigenous  base in
these industries. The report recommended  a) in the short term, a red. 1 ction of high tariffs to 50
percent, b) in the medium term, narrow the tariff band to lie between 4 and 20 percent, with only
infant  industries  being  allowed  higher tariffs  for a limited  duration, and c) in the long term, a uniform
tariff of 20 percent for purely protective  purposes.
MALAWI:  The Bank urged eliminating  tariffs on non-competing  imports and reducing the tariff on
compet;ng  products and intermediate  goods in a 1985  study. Since the new surtax would give credit
for taxes paid on input purchase it would, ceteris paribus, increase the ERP to import competing
products. To avoid  this effect, tariffs on imports  were reduced.19-
JAMAICA: A number of early reports on Jamaica indicate the lack of a systemic view of tariff
reform.  It appears  that specific industries  (footwear,  garment, and construction)  had been targeted
for duty-free import of inputs. In 1983, however, the Bank urged a review of import duties and
argued that the exclusion  from duty of raw materials, intermediate  inputs, and capital  goods imports
encouraged  capital intensity. It suggested  that such measures  prompted increased  taxes on income  to
replace foregone tariff revenue. As a condition of SAL II, the possibility of imposing duties on
imports  of raw materials and capital  goods  while  rebating  the duties  to exporters  was to be discussed.
A  technical assistance loan in  1985 supported a  study of Jamaican comparative
advantage and the study recommended  a flat rate uniform tariff of 25 percent. The government
rejected  this proposal and announced  a decision  to lower tariffs gradually  until they corresponded  to
a 4-rate structure within a 5-30 percent band. This was to be achieved  by lowering  high rates and
raising low rates. In 1987  a trade and finance  SECAL  included  as a condition  the review  of restricted
items by the Bank and the tariff reform commnittee.  A maximimum tariff of 60 percent and a
minimum of 5 percent were also recommended. Since the nominal tariff was composed of the
statutory  tariff and so-called  stamp duties, tariff reform had to simplify  and rationalize  this structure.
The tariff on raw material and capital goods were to be set at 15 and 20 percent respectively.
TURKEL(:  The guiding objectives of a  1985 report were achievement  of uniform ERPs across
industries and the lowering of  average tariffs to  7 percent. In  1987 a Bank study on Turkey
commented that average tariffis  on intermediate  goods were lower than the average tariff on final
goods and this indicated that effective protection for final goods production was higher than the
nominal tariff rate. However, the report concluded  that ERPs give no clear signal for tariff reform
since distortion costs depend on nominal tariffs and not ERPs. ERPs may guide reform of the
protective structure but this objective  is better achieved  by production subsidies  rather than tariffs.- ?20  -
Turkey taxed capital goods imports at a high rate and the 198  study recommended  that, since this
placed Turkish entrepreneurs  at a disadvantage,  this tariff be eliminated.
GHANA: In 1986  a both the Fund and the Bank found the tariff structure in Ghana to be appropriate
and recommended  that the use of QRs be reduced. They noted  that an overvalued  exchange  rate offset
some of the protection provided by the tariff structure. A temporary across-the-board  import sur-
charge was recommended  to mop up scarcity premia due to quotas.
INDONESIA:  A Bank report recommended  eliminating  QRs and gradually reducing tariffs while
providing  adjustment  assistance  to affected  industries.  Both the level and variance in ERPs were to
be lowered over time. Tariffs on intermediate  and final goods were to be lowered  to encourage  price
competition and to  reduce domestic costs. A subsequent report commented on tariff reforms
undertaken  by the government  which reduced the maximum  tariff (for all except 19 product groups)
from 225% to 60%, reduced the number of tariff levels and the dispersion of rates. However,
simultaneously,  new QRs had been introduced.  The report argued that the development  of upstream
industries  through protection would raise costs for downstream  industries and lower their effective
protection. Future development  should be along  lines that would not require protection  or subsidies.
This required eliminating  QRs and lowering  tariffs.
In 1987,  the Bank noted  that recent government  ations had reduced QRs and increased
the relative importance  of the need for tariff rationalization.  Tariffs had been increased  on certain of
the intermediate  and final goods which were freed from QRs. Other inputs had had tariff reductions.
It was recommended  that attention  should  now be paid to reducing  tariffs on the outputs. The report
emphasized  the need for a tariff structure  that restricted  the range of tariffs to a narrow band.- 21 -
The  1987 Trade Policy Adjustment  loan recommended  removal of QRs and their
replacement  by tariffs, the relaxation  of import licensing  restrictions  on 110 items and their removal
from 165 items. Tariffs on 152 items not produced locally were to be reduced to the 0-5 percent
range and the maximum  tariff was to be lowered  to 60 percent. This TPA loan also included  a recom-
mendation  to replace  the sales tax with a VAT.
More recently,  the Bank  reviewed  the reforms in tariff levels and reduction  of QRs and
recommended  that an across-the-board  tariff reduction would clarify the government's intention  of
achieving  a low and narrow tariff structure. The Bank also noted that the primary objective  of tariff
policy should  be to provide  relatively  low and consistent  levels of protection  across activities, rather
than to generate  revenues.
MOROCCO:  The main recommendations  in Morocco  related  to QR reduction in the 1979-82  period.
A 1984 report recommended  phasing out of the Special Import Tax (SIT) and achieving a lower
maximum tariff.  A  ceiling ERP  of  25  percent was also  an  object of  this  ITPA loan. The
comprehensive  trade study  of 1984  recommended  a phased  program  of QR elimination  and reduction
of tariffs with the intention of achieving a maximum ERP of 25 percent in 5 years.  rhe  study
suggested  that a higher level of tariff protection  be allowed  for new industries  on a temporary basis.
ZAIRE: Reduction  of the level and dispersion  of tariffs was sought to be achieved in Zaire by the
introduction  of a minimum  and a maximum  tariff of 10 and 60 percent respectively  with a timetable
to reduce the maximum  to 30 percent in 3 years. While the object of this exercise at one point was
to achieve  a uniform  nominal  tariff of 30 percent  this was later amended  to achieve  a maximum  tariff
of 30 percent.- 22 -
Issues Raised in World Bank Recommendations
on Tariff Policy in Selected Countries
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Revenue  Effect ofTariff  X  j  X  NI  X  X  0  O,X  X  O,X  X  X
Protective  Effect of  X  I
Domestic Indirect  Tax  X  X  X  X  X,0  X  O,X  X  X
Tariff Structure
1.  Lower Input Tariffs  X  X  X  X
2.  Redue Tariff Range  X  X  X  X  X
rmx
3.  Uniform  Tariff  X  25  X  X  X
To provide a convenient and quick reference, the issues addressed by policy recommendations  or
.elevant to the discussion  .n the country  reports are identified  with an "X" in the appropriate  box in the
table above.  "NI" indicates  that the item was not an issue. An "O" indicates  that the issue was either
overlooked  or underestimated. Clearly, the text provides a more complete  discussion  and complements
the broad picture above.- 23 -
PAKISTAN:  The Bank's recommendations  in Pakistan  have followed  a two stage strategy of reform
with the first stage devoted to eliminating  QRs and various duty exemptions  and concessions, and
stage two proceeding to tariff range compression  hand-in-hand  with development  of a broad based
sales tax. The overall objective has been to  attain a  lower and less dispersed range of ERP.
Regarding  tariffs on inputs, a 1987  Bank report, in contrast  to earlier reports, highlighted  a concern
with high tariffs on raw material imports  which were retarding the growth of downstream  industries
by lowering  their ERP. The same  report recommended  a minimum  10%  tariff (to replace  the existing
import surcharge)  and suggested  "rationalizing"  the structure  of tariffs  by setting  rates of 10-20%  for
raw materials, 20-40% for intermediate  inputs, and 40-60%  for final goods.
BANGLADESri: The Bank's  1987 recommendations  in Bangladesh consisted of suggestions to
replace QRs with tariffs and to reduce the range and level of ERPs by reducing nominal  tariffs. The
number of tariff rates were sharply reduced  and sales taxes that applied only to imports  were slated
for elimination. The assignment  of products  to different  rates was found  to be disorganized  and was
recommended  for rationalization.  Anomalies  created by having higher tariffs on inputs than applied
to final goods  we:e sought  to be eliminated. The 1988 report focussed  on domestic tax reforms that
were essential  to release the revenue constraint  and permit further  tariff reform. It specifically  recom-
mended switching  to a consumption  based domestic  tax (a manufacturing  and import  level VAT) and
suggested  that tariffs should be used only to provide  time-bound  protection  to infant industries.
III. Conclusion
This review has focussed  on the Bank's analysis  and recommendations  on a range of
related issues: the revenue impact  of tariff reforms, the role of domestic  indirect taxes in protection,
and the structure of protection.  In principle these issues should be  analysed using a  common- 24 -
integrating  framework  which efficiently  matches instruments  and objectives. Recognizing  that tariffs
have both a protection and revenue function  while domestic  indirect taxes are best used for revenue
generation  suggests  a coordinated  approach  to tariff and tax reform.  In particular, it is inadvisable
to view tatiffs purely as instruments  for protection  and to neglect  their revenue function. Such an
approach runs the risk of exacerbating fiscal deficits and jeopardizing both the tariff reform and
stabilization  objectives. Neglecting  the protective  effect of existing indirect taxes implies that tariff
reforms may even fail to achieve  protection  objectives.
At the outset  of this paper we defined  what an integrated  approach  to taxes and tariffs might  suggest
as a desirable structure of these instruments. The general conclusion  that emerges from the review
is that such a public finance  perspective  is often not present in the Bank's recommendations  on tariff
reform.
a) Revenue  concerns are often not adequately  addressed in the design of tariff proposals.
b) The protective  effect of domestic indirect  taxes is often not recognized.
c) While a few reports featured recommendations  to introduce a uniform tariff, there appeared  to
be little consensus  on a desirable tariff structure.
A. Tariffs and Revenue:  The evidence  on whether  tariff reform  proposals anticipated  revenue  effects
is mixed but clearly suggests  that there is scope for improving  the quality of policy advice through
more explicit consideration  of revenue  concerns.
The Bank, as noted eulier,  has had a standard proposal which consisted  of replacing QRs
with tariffs and thereafter reducing  tariffs.  The typical response to short-term revenue concerns  in
the light of these proposals has been that revenue would not decline by much, if at all. The reason
for this assessment  has been that, while tariff reductions  would lead to some revenue loss, it would
be offset by additions to the tariff base caused by a) transferring QR items to the tariff list, b)- 25 -
increased imports  through legal channels, c) removal  of existing exemptions,  and d) introduction  of
a minimum tariff.  On occasion, Bank reports recommended increasing the domestic sales tax
(Morocco)  or reducing  the subsidy  to domestic  capital goods (Turkey)  in an effort'to offset revenue
decline  due to tariff reductions. In Zaire the revenue  loss due to reduction  of the maximum  tariff was
expj  cted to be more than offset by an increase  in the minimum  tariff.
Few reports addressed the longer-term  need to reduce the reliance on trade taxes for revenue. A
report on  Malawi recommended shifting the revenue function to  the domestic indirect tax by
broadening the base and elasticity of this tax while reducing tariffs on imports.  A report on
Bangladesh recommended  moving towards the development  of a manufacturing-cum-import  stage
VAT which would shoulder the burden of the revenue function  by taxing consumption  rather than
imports and inputs.
Since much  of the trade liberalization  undertaken  to date has focussed  on replacing  QRs with tariffs,
which may be presumed to have been revenue enhancing, this neglect may not have been costly. 6
Nevertheless, some cases of stalled reforms or policy reversal may be traced to revenue declines
following  tariff reforms.  Future trade policy reforms are more likely to deal with tariff reductions
that lose revenue and must give more prominence  to developing  revenue alternatives.
B. Protection  and Domestic  Taxes:  The protective  effect of domestic  indirect  taxes could  emerge from
a number of different channels and differences in the statutory tax rate is only the most obvious
source. Indirect tax exemptions  for domestic industries,  differential 'markup' factors, and tax base
definition  are other more subtle  sources of protection. While a number  of reports indicated  that the
Recent empirical work by Pritchett and Sethi (1992) suggests that even more than the tariff rates themselves, tho scope of
exemptions may play a significant role in determining revenue outcomes.  The reduction of high end tariffs may have
minimal adverse consequences for revenue if appropriate adiustments  are made regarding the system of exemptions.- 26 -
domestic indirect  tax should feature symmetric  treatment  of imports  and domestic goods, it was not
obvious that this meant anything  more profound  than equal statutory tax rates.  M  o  r  e
importantly, the failure to  mention or  discuss this issue in  many country cases is probably an
indication  that it was not analysed,  rather than evidence  that domestic indirect  taxes had no effect on
protection. For example,  an JMF-IBRD  study on Thailand  highlighted  the existence  of discriminatory
taxation  of imports  under the Business  tax which  had not been addressed  by earlier Bank work in the
area.
C. Tariff Structure: While this review suggests  that the Bank has often proposed  replacing  QRs with
tariffs and almost always suggested  that the level and the range of nominal tariffs be reduced, in few
cases is a long term objective  of reform spelt out beyond this limited prescription. Most studies are
very disparate in their analysis  and the recommendations  indicate  that there is little consensus  on a
desirable tariff structure.
In a number of cases the Bank suggested  that the ultimate objective of tariff policy
should be a uniform nominal tariff. In some cases increasing  the tariff on inputs while lowering  the
maximum  tariff (on final goods) is a method to approach  a uniform  nominal tariff objective. While
the recommendation  to narrow the tariff band is consistent  with movement  towards a uniform  tariff,
some Bank studies express concern over the reduced protection for downstream industries as a
consequence  of the necessary  increase  in tariffs on inputs. Others indicate  that protection  of upstream
industries  is needed and recommend  raising input  tariffk to achieve  this objective. In many studies
the suggested  treatment is to increase the tariff on inputs to narrow the ERP on final goods while
ensuring that there is some tariff escalation, i.e. final goods are taxed at a higher rate than inputs.
One study (Turkey)  expressed  concern  that tariff escalation  causes final goods  to have an ERP higher
than the nominal tariff and recommended  reducing  final good tariffs on this account. Some amount- 27 -
of confusion may thus be said to exist regarding the appropriate  tariff structure given the lack of
agreement  in the recommended  tariff treatment of raw material and intermediate  inputs.
Summary: In conclusion:
i) There is considerable  scope to improve  the quality  of the Bank's tariff proposals  by paying
more attention to developing  alternative  tax instruments  to offset the revenue effect of tariff
reduction,
ii) While the Bank has often recommended  similar domestic tax treatment of imports and
domestic  goods it is apparent that the existing  protective  role of domestic indirect  taxes is not
always recognized  in the design of tariffs,
iii) While uniform tariffs were proposed in a  few cases, there does not appear to  be a
consensus  on what is an appropriate  structure of tariffs. In particular, the tariff treatment of
intermediate  inputs provokes  contradictory  recommendations  depending  on whether  priority is
given to protecting  upstream or downstream  industries.- 28 -
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